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resumo
O texto trata do papel do Mercosul dentro da estratégia do governo brasileiro 
desde meados dos anos oitenta até os dias de hoje. Este artigo procura demonstrar 
que o centro da estratégia internacional brasileira não é a consolidação do Merco-
sul, mas antes a busca de uma cadeira no Conselho de Segurança da ONU. 
Palavras-chave: Mercosul. Política externa. Conselho de Segurança da ONU.
abstract
The goal of this article is to analyze the role of Mercosur within the Brazilian 
government since the 1980’s. This article seeks to demonstrate that the center of 
Brazilian international strategy is not to consolidate Mercosur, but to obtain a 
permanent seat in the Security Council at United Nations.
Keywords: Mercosur. Foreign policy. Security Council at United Nations.
theoretical discussion – theoretical aspects of mercosur
The meaning of “theory”
Some authors, such as Frey et al (1991, p. 61) suggest that theory is:
[…] a generalization about a phenomenon, an explanation of how or why some-
thing occurs. Indeed, any statments that explain what is measured or described 
– any general statements about cause or effect – are theory based, at least impli-
citly. It [is] a generalization about a phenomenon that explains how or why the 
phenomenon occurs.
Therefore, we should be careful not to create a theory and try to insert 
out reality in that theory. It is the theory that should explain the fact and not 
the opposite. Kaplan (1964, p. 17) has out this idea in a very simple way when 
he said:
1 Prof. Ricardo Wahrendorff Caldas possui graduação em Economia (1984) e mestrado em Ciência Po-
lítica pela Universidade de Brasília (1989). Obteve o Ph.D. em Relações Internacionais pela University 
of Kent at Canterbury (1994). É diretor do Centro de Estudos Avançados Multidisciplinares (Ceam) 
da Universidade de Brasília (UnB).
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[…] A theory is a way of making sense of a disturbing situation (or novel ex-
perience) so as to allow us to more effectively to bring to bear our repertoire of 
habits, and, even more important, to modify habits or discard them altogether, 
replacing them by new ones as the situation demands(…). To engage in theo-
rizing means not just to learn by experience but to take thought about what is 
there to be learned […].
Therefore, one should work with theories that really can offer a better 
understanding of what is happening.
In the case of Regional Integration, one has three main directions of 
theoretical discussions.
Firstly, it will be mentioned the Supranational Theories: such as Neo-
functionalism, which emphasizes the spill-over effect of integration, in a gra-
dual way. The basis of the approach will be the contributions of Ernst B. Haas, 
Leon N. Lindberg, Philippe C. Schmitter, Stuart A. Scheingold, Joseph S. 
Nye.
Secondly, there is the Neoinstitutional approach, which try to discuss 
regional integration from the point of view of the role played by institutions 
in the regional process. They emphasize the role that institutions have as the 
main actor to influence the behavior of the actors involved. In this respect, 
the discussion of International Regimes is an example of the role played by 
institutions.
Thirdly, it should be mentioned the State Centered Theories, which em-
phasize the role of the National government or the Bureaucracy, in a general 
way.
This paper will be based in the third approach, State-Centric Theories. 
This means that in this paper it is believed that this is the approach that ex-
plains better integration for Regional Integration in South America. This me-
ans that special focus will be given to the relationship between internal and 
external structures, actors and processes from a historical perspective, but cen-
tered on the role played by State actors.
From now it will be discussed the main characteristics of these three theo-
retical aspects and in the next section it will be analyzed if they can be applied 
to Brazilian foreign policy or not.
The role of neo-functionalism
One of the main exponents of this school is Haas.2
Inedeed, Haas launched the idea that States were ceasing their sovereign-
ty in order to obtaining gains from regional integration. In the famous quota-
tion of Haas (1970, p. 610):
2 Most of this section – unless explicitly mentioned – is based on Ernst B. Haas (1970).
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[…] The study of regional integration is concerned with explaining how and why 
states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge 
and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty 
while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves.
It is interesting to note that functionalism was trying to explain regional 
integration in the case of Western Europe (then EEC), focused in the role 
of the state is the primary actor. However, as Haas (1970) has argued in the 
paragraph above as a direct result of functionalism, there was a “loss of sove-
reignty” of the state. Partially, the loss of sovereignty of the State resulted in 
spill-over effects initially in the areas affected by regional integration and poten-
tially in other areas positively affected, in what economist call of externalities.
The motto behind regional integration is the deepening of regional inte-
gration leads to more benefits to all the members involved.
Some of the key concepts of Haas (1970) are:
“•	 Political Community”: This concept implies that the loyalty of groups 
and individuals would be directed towards the political centre of the sys-
tem. In the case of Europe, towards political institutions, such as the Eu-
ropean Parliament, the European Commission, etc.
“Political Integration”:•	
This means that during the process of regional integration, there would 
be a shift of loyalties, where the main institution to be obeyed would be 
the supranational institutions being created and not the National State.
“The Spill-over effect”:•	
Ujupan (2005, p. 28) has suggested some of the main characteristics 
of the spill-over effect. Among them, she mentions that “the idea of spillo-
ver [was] according to which integration would deepen from economic to 
political and the result would be an integrated union of states (and their 
societies) which would acquire the characteristics of “domestic political 
systems”.
Haas (1970) works with some basic assumptions. Among them, it could 
be mentioned:
Pluralistic Composition of Society. In the case of Europe, there would be •	
a certain “symmetrical heterogeneity”. Ujupan (2005, p. 32) has suggested 
that: “[…] The society is composed of various groups of interests and the 
integration process would better satisfy them.
Technical Perspective of the Regional Integration.•	  Technical solutions 
would be more and more instrumental and the technicians would occupy 
the space of politicians in the leadership of regional integration.
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Rationalistic Behavior by Political Actors and the State. This approach su-•	
ggests that each actor – and in particular the State –, who continues to be 
the main actor, has a clear view of its role and behaves in a strict rational 
way, based on its own interests.
But, who are the main actors? Faber (2006) suggests that those actors are:
i. Political, economic and social elites in each country. It could be argued that 
those elites fill a double function: in one direction (from the centre to the local 
regions) they bring the ideas of integration to the groups under their influen-
ce, helping to socialize and legitimize them and in the other direction (from 
local regions to the centre of the system) the elites presents their demands to 
the centre of the system. Those demand can belong only to the elites or to 
thither social groups without representation. Any case, the elite present the 
demand as belonging to all groups of society.
ii. Supranational institutions (for instance, European Commission) which de-
velop their own interests and aims. Ujupan (2005, p. 28) has mentioned that: 
“The existence of a high authority (above the nation states) which would give 
the integration process the right direction ”.
iii. Governments of member states, who are the centre of power.3 Of course, the 
governments follow their own agenda and work through coalitions with other 
governments.
The dynamics of regional integration, according to neofunctionalism, ac-
cording to Faber (2006) is that there is a learning processes of political actors, 
leading to increasing demands for more integration, resulting in spill-over 
reach many dimensions:
economic spill-over;•	
political spill-over•	 ;
functional spill-over;•	
institucional spill-over;•	
spill-around; and•	
geographical spill-over.•	
In short, it could be said that Neo-functionalism seeks to explain:
the dynamics of regional integration;•	
the creation of a political community;•	
the trends of regional integration.•	
3 See the discussion of FABER (2006).
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The main strong points of the Neofunctionalist theory are:
 Orientation for Current events•	
Neofunctionalism is quite instrumental in analysing the evolution of facts 
of regional integration. This gives its follower the impression that it is extensi-
ve of a long period of time when in fact it is covering only some periods. 
Flexible theoretical formulation•	
Neofunctionalism is capable of adapting itself to other theoretical fra-
meworks, making it very attractive to authors who want to use more than one 
perspective or are not completely happy with their own theoretical perspective.
Applicability in several fields•	
It is interesting to note that Neofunctionalism can be applied to different 
fields, from security to macroeconomic policies. At the same time, neofunc-
tionalim can maintain it s original idea even if the results obtained in each area 
are not necessarily the same. This was the case for instance, in security, when 
European countries were divided over the creation or not of an European 
regime, while in monetary policy there was an almost consensus towards the 
creation of a common currency, the Euro.
On the other hand, some shortcomings of neofunctionalism can also be 
identified, such as:
neofunctionalism incapacity of making consistent generalisations;•	
its dependence of empirical evidence to maintain its framework.•	
Therefore, neo-functionalist becomes a hostage of empirical facts. But as 
the facts evolve, neofunctionalism loses its capacity to analyse current events 
and even more its capacity of prediction of long-terms events.
Conclusion about neo-functionalism 
Philippe C. Schmitter (2003, p. 11) has claimed that:
[…] No theory of regional integration has been as misunderstood, caricatured, 
pilloried, proven wrong and rejected as often as neo-functionalism. Numerous 
scholars have rejoiced at having “overcome” the much-decried antagonism be-
tween it and inter-governmentalism, presumably by adhering to some version 
or another of the latter. So much so, that with very few exceptions, virtually no 
one currently working on European integration openly admits to being a neo-
functionalist. Its own creator [Haas] has even declared it obsolescent – on two 
occasions! […]
The Intergovernmentalism Approach
An alternative perspective to neo-functionalism was Integovernamenta-
lism.
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In this approach, power is located at International organizations whose 
decisions are taken on behalf of national governments as an alternative to 
supranationalism, where institutions prevail over national governments. The 
methods of decision-making at international organizations tend to vary a lot. 
Nevertheless, most international organizations adopt unanimity decisions in 
order to obtain a “consensus building” from their members.4
The main supporter of this theory, Stanley Hoffman, argues that national 
states are still relevant and they dictate the rythmum of regional integration, 
in particular in Europe, whe the theory was first applied to.
Therefore, Integovernamentalism opposes the core basis and premises of 
neofunctionalism, in particular when applied to European integration. Only 
when national governments are ready to accept a direct reduction of their po-
wer, they appeal to the creation of a new institution at a supranational level.
Therefore, supranational institutions tend to reflect the wishes of national 
state’s decisions and not the increase of power of international organizations, 
as the neo-functionalism theory claims.
In order to understand how national states He believed that integration, 
driven by national governments, was often based on the domestic political 
and economic issues of the day. The theory rejects the concept of the spill over 
effect that neofunctionalism proposes. He also rejects the idea that suprana-
tional organizations are on an equal level (in terms of political influence) as 
national governments.
An approach to integration that recognizes national states and central 
governments, in particular, as the primary actors in the integration process. 
Altought there are several intergovernmentalist perspectives to deal with the 
issue of regional integration, all of them have in common the premise that na-
tional government preferences prevail over the preferences of experts of inter-
national organizations. The advantage of intergovernmentalism is that it can 
explain moments of advance and moments of paralisys (inertia) in regional 
integration recurring to government national preferences.
Intergovernmentalism also accepts the role played by the institutionali-
sation of international politics and the role played by domestic actors on the 
formation of national governmental preferences.
This will be very important when we discuss the theory that best explain 
the evolution of Mercosur. An important derivation from intergovernmen-
talism was Liberal intergovernmentalism which will be discussed in the next 
section.
4 The most obvious example of this is The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Security Council 
of United Nations.
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The perspective of liberal intergovernmentalism5
Liberal intergovernmentalism, as proposed by Andrew Moravcsik 
(1993; 1991) argues that regional integration is driven by economic interests, 
within the following context:
states will cooperate when national interests converge;•	
institutions follow the national interest, as defined by each state;•	
European integration is better explained in its historical context of the •	
post - World War II and the competition between two superpowers for 
global hegemony.
Moravcsik (1993) suggests that there are three phases which are necessary 
to understand the process of regional integration. The first phase is domestic 
preference formation. The second phase is interstate bargaining. The final and 
third phase is the relation between the domestic actor with supranational ins-
titutions. This phase is directly linked to regime theory.
Domestic preference formation, or •	 policy demand. Several actors try to in-
fluence the policy demand. Among them, it could be mentioned social 
movement groups, special interests, the legislature and the executive. Mo-
ravscik (1993) believes that economic interests, in general, prevail over 
other interests. 
Interstate bargaining, or •	 policy supply. Moravcsik (1993) argues that agree-
ments are a direct result of the different interests and power capabilities of 
the states involved in a given negotiation.
Three factors influence the out comes: threat of non-agreement (•	 unilateral 
veto);
threats of exclusion (when a •	 party has no alternative but to accept the exis-
ting conditions in order not to be excluded from the agreement as a who-
le); mutual concessions based on inter-issue bargain, when a party makes a 
concession in a given issue in order to obtain advantage or a concession 
in another topic completely different and dissociated from the first issue 
initially negotiated, but which reflect its national interest.
Supranational institutions tend to foster mutual concessions because:
it reduces transaction costs•	 ; 
it increases the autonomy of national governments from citizens•	 , based in the 
legitimacy and credibility acquired by them.
5 This section is based on Moravcsik (1993; 1991).
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The liberal institutionalism approach (ROSENAU; CZEMPIEL, 2000)
Söderbaum (2004, p. 6-7) argues that Liberal institutionalism is curren-
tly the most accepted approach in the study of regional integration.
Liberal institutionalism is centred on the state. The National State is seen 
as a selfish and maximizer actor. It seeks to maximise its gains based on its own 
national interests.
While in the realist theory, states fight to ensure their own survival, in Li-
beral institutionalism states cooperate with other states in order to obtain gains 
that would not be possible to be obtained by themselves. Therefore, common 
interests are as important as national interests.
States promote institutions in order to achieve the solution of common 
interests in a faster way. Institutions also help to sort out problems of collecti-
ve action, such as Olson had described.
The neo-realism perspective
Neo-realism as it was proposed Waltz (1979) characterize the internatio-
nal system as essentially anarchical.6 International arena is characterized by 
a fight for power politics. States fight for their own survival (from external 
threats).
Neo-realism differs from old realist school for its perception about the 
role of regions. Other characteristics of neo-realism are:
realism used to see regional integration as a deviation of national interest;•	
as in Realism, for neo-realists, State is still the main actor in international •	
relations;
states tray to counter-balance the possibility of failing to maximise their •	
gains with other sorts of compensations;
some gains can also be obtained through international cooperation;•	
for Neo-realists, regional integration can be explained in the same way that •	
a political or military alliance is formed (WALT, 1987).
Another important feature of neo-realism which comes from realism is 
the issue of Hegemony. Nevertheless, neo-realism gave a new approach to po-
wer disputes when it started to discuss political confrontation – and fight for 
hegemony, in particular – within regions or in process or regional integration.
6 Although some authors argue that the main reference of neo-realism is Waltz (1979) one should not 
forget that the work of Waltz is based on the previous and seminal work of H. Morgenthau (1948).
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These important features can be summarized as:
reaction •	 of weaker states vis-à-vis a regional hegemon or aggressive state;
regional integration to limit a possible hegemon (EEC and West Ger-•	
many);
regional integration as a tool to follow the hegemon (Mexico in NAF-•	
TA);
declining hegemony, when regional integration is a source to increase the •	
power capabilities of a declining hegemon to achieve its personal goals.
Differentiation of Neorealism to understand regional integration:
neorealism neglects the domestic level - within the state and within the •	
region;
States are rational actors striving to gain benefits but the endogenous dy-•	
namic is not important.
the next approach to be discussed is globalisation
The globalist perspective
Globalisation is a systemic perspective, which tries to offer an approach 
from outside to inside in order to explain how States behave in international 
arena.
Therefore, Globalisation is an “outside-in” approach and not a “from wi-
thin” perspective. While rationalist approaches emphasize regionalism as a 
way of “solving problems”, Globalist support the view that regional integra-
tion is a result of a historical process, based on of the inter-crossing of several 
factors.
Globalisation include several concepts in itself, such as, “inter alia”, avai-
lability of new technology, in particular in the field of communication, the 
movement of values and ideas, increase in international trade of goods, gro-
wing liberalisation in services trade, increasing flows of financial services and 
increasing demands for mobility of people.
These factors, altogether, have contributed for regional integration. They 
have facilitated the appearing of a different relation to territory and to the 
Nation State. States were seen as only and sacred responsible for sovereignty.
But in order to solve some common problems (pollution of environmen-
tal, civil disasters, international financial crisis), some countries have decided 
to advance in regional integration process. The result was what some authors 
call “reterritorialisation”. Although it could be argued that in principle, Globa-
lisation is against the formation of regions, in fact, some countries are not 
prepared to be completely “global”, because:
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they don’t have a proper defence system (for instance, Costa Rica or Uru-•	
guay);
they have weak civil defence strucyures in case of natural disasters (for •	
instance, Paraguay);
they have an instable currency or poor macroeconomic policies (Argenti-•	
na);
they fear international competition (Brazil).•	
As a result, globalisation may encourage regional integration, instead of 
opposing it, as a first step towards a more open international environment. 
Other two movements which are consistent with the above arguments:
1) Foster Economic cooperation between “like-minded countries”
In order to prevent an uncontrolled expansion of economic trade and 
interdependence which could foster inequalities (north-South “integration”) 
and social disparities, it is encouraged a new form of “regional integration” 
South-South cooperations (G-3, G-4, G-24, BRIC, etc.). The idea is that pure 
Globalisation encourages disproportions and inequalities while “limited glo-
balisation” or “healthy globalisation” (regionalism) intervenes to soften “bad” 
or “pure” globalisation. The result is a reterritorialising the global economy 
and a new definition of regional integration which crosses the concept or local 
boundaries. The main goal is to take back some of the political control which 
was threatened by pure and “uncontrolled” globalisation.
2) Promote the feeling of Security between “ Reliable” countries
An almost “Global” issue by definition, security can be obtained lo-
cally (or regionally). Regional Alliances are a possible answer (for instance, 
NATO).
 Conclusions of Globalization:
1) Regionalism and Globalism are not incompatible, but two sides from the 
same coin. In some cases, the development of region integration may be as-
sociated with a result to be avoided from Globalisation (“pure” free-market, 
for instance).
2) Regionalism and globalisation are concerned with the same issues, but give 
different answers.
The view of “Critical Theories”
“Critical Theories” tend to focus on roots and features of social participa-
tion in the regional phenomena. Its premise is that the process of Regional 
Integration should be concerned with inclusiveness and participation issues.
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The idea is that Construction of a political community should be the 
basis of the construction of the regional integration process.
The prime responsible for the process is less important than the concept 
behind it: “commonality”. For “commonality” it should be understood, the 
cultural, historical and social affinities. As Hurrell (1995, p. 64) explicitly 
writes,
 [...] focus on regional awareness and regional identity, on the shared sense of be-
longing to a particular regional community, on what has been called  “cognitive 
regionalism”. They stress the extent to which regional cohesion depends on a sus-
tained and durable sense of community based on mutual responsiveness, trust, 
and high levels of what might be called “cognitive interdependence”.
Therefore, in the “Critical Theories” perspective the empowerment of the 
process can rest anywhere (states, groups, individuals).
It is going to be argued that this approach can not be applied to Merco-
sur, for the reasons that will be presented in the next sections. 
Now it is going to be describe the evolution of Regional Integration in 
South America and afterwards the theory that can better explain the process.
ambitions, interests and perceptions in Brazil on regional in-
tegration
Regional ambitions and interests of Brazil
In Brazilian diplomatic history, the objectives and interests of Brazilian 
diplomacy could be divided in the following stages7:
i) during its monarchical period, in the first half of the XIX century, the main 
concerns Brazilian diplomats were the Plata Basin (Bacia do Prata) issues, in 
particular related to the borders with Argentina; the main actors in this period 
were the Viscount of Uruguay and the Viscount of Rio Branco;
ii) in the second half of the XIX century and in the beginning of the XX cen-
tury, the relations with the US and the “American” continent absorbed most 
part of the time of Brazilian diplomacy, which were led then by Barão do Rio 
Branco.8
According to Moniz Bandeira (2004a), the foreign policy of Barão do 
Rio Branco (1903-1912), developed the latent trend of Brazilian empire di-
plomacy (1822-1889), and followed similar lines. It considered Americas a 
kind of condominium, in which Brazil would use freely its influence over the 
7 In http://www.mre.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1031&Itemid=368.
8 Barão do Rio Branco was the son of Viscount of Rio Branco.
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South, while the US would keep the North [American], o Central [Americas] 
and the Caribbean under its “control” (BANDEIRA, 2004).
iii) in the middle of the XX century, in particular during the World War II 
(1939-1945), Brazilian diplomacy was concerned in how to insert Brazil in 
the Western World. In this issue, Oswaldo Aranha played a central role;
iv) after the World War II, in particular the period that covers the so-called, 
Brazilian Independent Foreign Policy (1961-1964), Brazilian diplomats star-
ted to be concerned with Brazil’s insertion in the complete world. In this 
discussion, Ambassador João Augusto de Araújo Castro led the debate and be-
came one of the main formulators of Brazilian contemporary foreign policy.
Brazil’s interests in the Perspective of Araújo Castro9
What were the main ideas of Araújo Castro, foreign minister of Brazil 
during such a short period (1963) but whose ideas influenced generations of 
Brazilian diplomats?
As he had witnessed Japanese recovery, as Brazilian Ambassador to Japan 
(1958-1960) he was strongly influenced by economic growth in the post-war. 
Araújo Castro then incorporated to Brazilian foreign policy the concern with 
economic development of developing countries. He also included a strong 
concern with anti-colonialism and anti-racism. In the 1950’s he also noticed 
the growing importance that issues such as the support to human rights and 
ecological preservation would receive at world level.10
In other words, Araújo Castro was a diplomat, and before that, an intel-
lectual before his time had arrived.
Personally, Araújo Castro was a convinced liberal. He managed to sum-
marize his ideas (anti-colonialism, anti-racism, support to human rights and 
ecological preservation) with his perspective of the Brazilian idiosyncrasies 
in the international context. Therefore, he managed to put Brazilian foreign 
policy in sintony with national aspirations and project Brazilian interests in 
the foreign affairs in a global perspective.11 Araújo Castro was President of 
the Security Council of the United Nations (1968) and, for his inclination to 
dialogue, he had great prestige in international forums.12
His performance at Security Council strengthened Brazilian position 
in the do Brazil in international organizations such as the Organizations of 
American States (OAS), The United Nation Conference for Trade and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD) e the United Nations itself.13
9 This section is based in a short biography made by Ministry of Foreign Affairs about Araújo Castro, and 
his interview to Brazilian magazine Veja in 19/05/1971.
10 In: http://www.mre.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1031&Itemid=368.
11 Idem.
12 Idem.
13 Idem.
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Araújo Castro developed his ideas and concepts after his personal experi-
ence as a diplomat. He followed Brazilian President’s attempts to launch in 
1958 the Pan-American Operation (OPA). This project and its organization 
would influence all his career as a diplomat.14
Disappointed with the negotiations about Pan-American Operation 
(OPA), he asked to go to Japan. When he returned from Japan, he became 
an expert in disarmament and, in 1962, Henry Kissinger recommended to a 
specialized journal to ask an article from Araújo Castro. In 1963 he was pro-
moted to general-secretary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which in Brazil 
equals to Vice-Minister. In the same year, he became Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs (Itamaraty).15
In September of the same year, when he was heading Brazilian delegation 
to General Assembly of the United Nations, he announced his famous policy 
of the “Three Ds”: Development, Disarmament and Decolonization. These 
“Three D’s” influenced for decades Brazilian diplomacy.
In 1968, he was nominated Brazilian Ambassador to the U.N. one year 
after that nomination, became the President of its Security do Council. Dur-
ing his two years in which he led the Security Council, Araújo Castro he 
could know better the working and functioning of the UN Security Council 
an of the UN itself. He became frustrated for what he saw due to the lack of 
efficiency of an international organization that he had believed (until 1964) 
capable of a major activity in favor of peace and development of the world.16
He classified his generation as “skeptical” and refused to put the respon-
sibility in the UN for the problems of the world. For Araújo Castro, the ques-
tion was not to know if the UN, OAS, UNESCO or UNCTAD were good or 
bad. The question for him was if we were working within these organisms in 
the best way possible.17
In his view, the mere creation of international organizations for the dis-
cussion of old problems of the same countries was an illusion. When he left 
the UN, transferred to Washington, he was complimented by the then gen-
eral-secretary of UN, U Thant, as one of the more competent diplomats ever 
sent to the organization (UN).18
14 Interview to Brazilian magazine Veja (19/05/1971) called “Friends are Friends but business are apart”: 
“The Friendship Brazil-US and the Interests of Each One”. (“Negócios à Parte: a amizade Brasil-EUA 
e os interesses de cada um”). In this interview, Araújo Castro describes his impressions about Foster 
Dulles, then Head of the US Department of State. Araújo Castro blamed the intransigence [of Foster 
Dulles] and the demagogic behavior of Brazilian [Kubitschek] government for the failure of the Pan-
American Operation (OPA) after hours of negotiation between the Secretary of State and the Brazilian 
President Kubitschek. 
15 Interview to Brazilian magazine Veja (19/05/1971).
16 Idem.
17 Idem.
18 Idem. His name was articulated to the succession of U Thant, but was vetoed by the Soviet Union.
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When Araújo Castro arrived to Brazilian Ambassador in the US, in1971, 
he tried to put Brazil-Us relations in a level of absolute realism e serious-
ness. Until then, Brazil-US relations were based on fake and superficial af-
fections.19
This kind of relations was condemned by Araújo Castro when he said 
before Brazilian Commission of Foreign Affairs, that arguments such as “we 
were allied in two wars” and “we are just one hemisphere” – which were the 
tonic of Brazilian diplomatic speech in search of special relations with the US 
– didn’t make any sense in Washington.20
For Araújo Castro (1971), “no one gives anything to anyone for free”. 
This professional coldness was essential to obtain results in his view.21
Rai, padronizar fontes das aspas
Araújo Castro believed that “with economic development, Brazil could 
dare to practice a realist diplomacy”. For “realist diplomacy” he understands 
that the highest the principles, the economic negotiation always allows that a 
country appears as strong and the other as weak, because a complete equality 
of negotiators happens only when juridical issues are being discussed.22
At this point, Araújo Castro (1974; 1975; 1982, p. 285) recognized the 
existence of States with different levels of power. This can considered the basis 
of a (neo) realist perspective of a foreign policy.23
Indeed, According to Moniz Bandeira (2004b, p. 39), after Araújo Cas-
tro’s experience as Brazilian Ambassador in the US. Araújo Castro recognized 
that US foreign policy was based on a “cold concept of realism and pragma-
tism” (MONIZ BANDEIRA, 2004b, p. 39). Since then, Brazilian diplomacy 
started to denounce the “freezing of the structure of the world power” (MONIZ 
BANDEIRA, 2004b, p. 39). This “freezing of the structure of the world pow-
er” was particularly evident in the maintenance of the Security Council of 
the United Nations with the same structure of its creation, after the Second 
World War (MONIZ BANDEIRA, 2004b, p. 81).
Moniz Bandeira (2004b, p. 81) noted that Brazil was among the top ten 
economies in the world and wished a place [in the Security Council] between 
its Permanent members and decided to put its demand openly.
It can be said that after Araújo de Castro’s denounce of the “freezing of the 
structure of the world power” in the 1970’s, the demand for a stable place in the 
Security Council of the United Nations became a permanent feature of Brazil-
ian diplomacy. The only difference is on emphasis. Some governments have 
19 Idem.
20 Idem.
21 Idem.
22 Idem.
23 This issue is going to be developed later on.
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emphasized more openly this demand, such as the Lula Government, while 
other governments, such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso did not consider 
the demand as the only concern of Brazilian diplomacy. In spite of this fact, 
as Moniz Bandeira (2004b, p. 368) notes, that Brazil, even under Cardoso 
Administration (1995-2002), and in a more discreet fashion, also fought for a 
permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations.
Therefore, the search for a seat in the Security Council had as its premise 
some kind of Brazilian hegemony in South America. The kind of hegemony 
would certainly change, with the return to South American countries to de-
mocracy.
The 19080’s, it assumes a more cooperative feature, as the Brazilian Presi-
dent José Sarney’s initiative of discussing the integration of Brazil with Argen-
tina in a common market illustrates, as reminded us Moniz Bandeira (2004b, 
p. 81).
As Moniz Bandeira (2004b, p. 82) noted: “Brazil’s perspective was that 
the custom union evolved to a common market, where the macro-economic po-
licies would be unified, and where the basis for some kind of supranational 
institutions would be present, such as the European Union, what would make 
it possible for Brazil to transform in reality its ‘destiny’ of world power, not in an 
isolated fashion, but together with other South American countries”.
Factors are driving the Brazilian government’s interest in regional 
economic integration
Initially, it should be mentioned that the 1990’s were characterized by 
the proliferation of regional agreements. While between 1947 (foundation of 
the GATT) around 70 notifications under article XXIV (regional integrations 
agreements) were made, in the 1990’s alone they reached more than one hun-
dred (MONIZ BANDEIRA, 2004b, p. 82).
According to Bouzas (2000, p. 424), there are several reasons for the 
proliferation of regionalism and some kind of proliferation of treaties in the 
1900s:
a) the change of attitude of US trade policy in face of regionalism and discri-
mination [in many regions of globe];
b) the generalization of trade reforms and unilateral opening up of developing 
countries and in transition economies; and
c) the utility of regionalism’s potential for the growing global integration pro-
cess.
The fact that this process of opening up generalizes itself in several coun-
tries in the 1980’s made it possible to them to take part in many regional 
26 Revista do Ceam, v. 2, n. 2, jul./dez. 2013
agreements and even in the GATT multilateral regime itself for the time, as in 
the case of Mexico (BOUZAS, 2000, p. 425).
In this perspective, Bouzas (2000, p. 426) concludes that the rise of re-
gionalism in the 1990s is linked to the growing global integration process.
Bouzas (2000, p. 425) also noted that the growing complexity (and 
the inherent conflict) of the multilateral agenda [the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT] created favorable conditions for spaces more limited of negotiation. 
In these cases [as the example of Mercosur illustrates] a higher convergence of 
interests or the existence of relations of leadership or domination may allow a 
faster achievement in a “deeper integration” agenda.24
Bouzas (2000, p. 426) points out, very accurately, in a context of a more 
multilateral and more complex game [such as the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT], it increases the strategic value of he consolidation of an agenda and 
a more peculiar approach in the regional sphere (or mini-lateral), as the first 
step for a multilateral negotiation.
The government may take part of preferential trade agreements for seve-
ral reasons, including political or strategic reasons as Bouzas (2000, p. 427) 
noted.
In the case of Mercosur, it can be denied the impetus for hegemony from 
Brazil. Medeiros (2000, p. 200) notes that:
The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [in Cardoso’s government] as the un-
der-secretary for integration Graça Lima, adopt, not rarely, a very inflexible rhe-
toric, when transmitting Brazilian “de facto” hegemony [in Mercosur].
Medeiros (2000, p. 201) adds that:
[…] in the negotiations of Alca/FTAA […] as well as in the difficult negotiations 
with the European Union, the regional integration of Mercosur has revealed 
some virtues. It [the Mercosur] searches a hegemonic legitimacy of political nature, 
based in an instable economy, taking into consideration that the process of regio-
nal institutionalization [of Mercosur] has found itself marked also by a mutual 
strategy of cooperation.
The perspective of Medeiros (2000) confirms the view of Moniz Bandeira 
(2004a) when this author states that Brazil does not consider as “lost” its he-
gemonic project in the north of Latin America [Mexico, Central America and 
the Caribbean], because since the beginning of Monarchy, in the XIX Cen-
tury, never aspired to have any interference in those countries of that region, 
that always considered within the area of influence of the US. The concept of 
South America was always latent in the [Brazilian] foreign policy, and not the one 
24 The argument from Bouzas (2000) is based on Lawrence (1996).
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of Latin America, too generic, and without consistence with its real interests 
political and economic, which have always been restricted in particular, to 
the Plata Region, it is, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. And, as noted by 
João Augusto de Araújo Castro, Brazilian Ambassador in Washington (1971-
1975), Brazil has never considered its relations with the US as a chapter of the 
relations between the US and Latin America.
Therefore, Mercosur has to be seen from the perspective it has been crea-
ted: as a political project, of Brazil’s initiative (in Jose Sarney’s administration) 
to exercise Brazilian hegemony, which was not successfully implemented du-
ring the military regime in Brazil (1964-1985).
Brazil retakes this project of hegemony with a softer feature, of “coope-
ration”, but based on Brazil’s interests and aspirations, and not of its partners. 
Indeed, as Gratius (2008, p. 216) notes:
It is important to remeber that Brazilian economy was the most protected in 
Mercosur and that Brazil has an important national industry which, differently 
from Argentina, is not very open to foreign trade. If one takes into consideration 
that many Brazilian companies would not be very competitive at an internatio-
nal level, to maintain tariff and non-tariff barriers would be in the interests of 
Brazilian firms. In the foreign front, having the most protected economy of the 
four members of Mercosur, the consolidation of a custom union on behalf of 
Brazilian companies would be the main objective [of Mercosur]. Therefore, the 
price that Brazil asked from Argentina (which had lower tariffs) to consolidate 
the project Mercosur in the years 1994/1995 was the commitment to create a 
custom union with a common external tariff.
Gratius (2008, p. 217) goes even further and points out the advantages 
of the Mercosur’s custom union to Brazil:
[…] From the Brazilian perspective, a custom union had two advantages when 
comparaed to a simple free trade agreement: 1) prevents the entry of imports 
from abroad with lower tariffs via Argentina; and 2) it is more useful to define 
positions in bloc towards the European Union and the US, what would increase 
the negotiating capacity by the members countries of Mercosur. I this way, the 
formation of the custom union in janury 1st of 1995 made the negociations with 
Euroepean Union easier, with which Mercosur negociates for more than seven 
years an inter-regional trade agreement […].
Following the arguments presented above, one can argue that from the 
Brazilian point view the creation of Mercosur was due to political reasons 
(VAZ, 2002). It has two main goals:
a) to assure Brazil’s hegemony in South America; and
b) to allow Brazil to delay the process of integration of Brazilian (non compe-
titive) firms in the world economy.
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The first part of the project (Brazil’s hegemony in Mercosur) is obtained 
trough the formation of an axis Brazil-Argentina, similar to the one created 
between Germany and France in the European integration. Argentina recog-
nizes Brazil’s hegemony in Mercosur and in exchange Brazil allows Argentina 
a special access to its market, towards which more than 50% of Argentinean 
exports.
The second part of the project – Brazil’s resistance to a complete open-up 
of it seconomy in the world economy and ebeven in the continenet, through 
the FTAA project- is obtained – once more with the support of Argentina – 
by the creation of a custom union in Mercosur, where Brazil could keep its 
external barrier and non-barrier tariffs higher thath the world level claiming 
the they belong to Mercosur and not to Brazil itself. However, Mercosur’s 
common external tariffs reflect not the average of Mercosur’s members, but 
the average of Brazilian tariffs.
In the same way that the GATT reflected - when it was created in 1947 
– the general principles and tariffs of US Trade laws, practices and policies, 
Mercosur reflected the principles and tariffs of its hegemon, Brazil, with the 
full support and consent of its allied Argentina.25 The opinions of Mercosur’s 
junior members – Paraguay and Uruguay – are ignored in Mercosur (GRA-
TIUS, 2008).26
In other words, Brazil is not interested in the regional matters “per se”, but 
in the political gains that they can offer to Brazil in terms of power and prestige.
The main political objective of Brazil has not changed since Araújo Castro 
stated that the structure of world power had frozen: to increase the interna-
tional status of Brazil. This would be materialised by a permanent seat in the 
Security Council.
In order to obtain that goal, Brazilian diplomacy need to achieve some 
specific and short term objectives, among them it should be mentioned, inter 
alia:
to limit or counterbalance US influence in South America;•	
to create institutions with some degree of legitimacy (Alalc/Lafta and Mer-•	
cosur);
to have Brazilian leadership recognized in the existing institutions locally •	
(as Mercosur);
25 This does not mean or imply that Argentina and Brazil have to be in agreement about everything. 
Punctually some trade disputes do appear and both countries try to solve them directly, without passing 
through the mechanisms of Mercosur.
26 Of course, Brazil’s hegemony will be challenged by the appearing of new actors in South America’s 
region, hostile to Brazilian project of hegemony. Among them, Venezuela and Bolivia (not to mention 
Equator) are cases in point. These ‘new’ actors will offer a new challenge to Brazil`s capacity to act in 
South America as a hegemon and in the limit the project of Mercosur itself.
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to attract smaller countries (for instance, Uruguay and Paraguay) to its •	
integration schemes (Mercosur/Unasur);
to increase Brazil’s visibility through the participation in UN missions •	
(Angola, Haiti, Timor Leste, etc.).
The main result to be obtained if those above objectives are achieved is to 
have its bargaining capabilities in order international negotiations recognized 
and increased, through the use of coalitions, as the constitution of Mercosur 
illustrated.
It is important to note that all those objectives mentioned above have 
only one target, which is to achieve the oldest main goal of Brazilian diplo-
macy, it is to obtain a seat for Brazil in the Security Council.27
In order to achieve this goal all other actions are justified. In this respect, 
it is important for Brazil to be recognized as a regional leader and a global 
player. So, Brazil does not expect to obtain new markets in South American 
through its regional integration schemes, since its true goal is to seek support 
for its claim of a place in the Security Council.
Therefore, it could be said then, that all the Brazilian strategies (both in 
the regional and in the global level) follow the same pattern: to justify a per-
manent seat in the Security Council.
In this sense, in spite of the Brazilian government speech in favour of 
Mercosur, it is not the true motivation or a goal of Brazilian diplomacy, but 
a means of obtaining something bigger and permanent (the seat in the U.N. 
Security Council). The Mercosur was the visible part of Brazilian diplomacy’s 
strategy of reaching it goal. Therefore, the main factor that drives the Brazilian 
government’s interest in regional economic integration is to show leadership, 
to increase its influence and obtain more power resources as the (neo) reaolist 
theory suggests.
During the constitution of Mercosur, there was only one main threat 
that could put jeopardize the project: US proposal of creating a Free Trade 
Area in the Americas, from Alaska to Patagonia: FTAA. This fact explains 
why Brazil was always against this initiative and fought against FTAA a deaf 
fight, because Brazil could not appear as the main opposition to the project. 
As a matter of fact, Brazil would fight any regional integration scheme where 
it would not play a central role, be it the Free Trade Area in Americas, be it 
a another one. In the case of FTAA, its main player - with a leading role on 
it - was obviously the US.
27 It is worthy mentioning that this Brazilian aspiration goes back to the League of Nations in the 1930s, 
where Brazil also sought to obtain, without success, a place in the Council of that organization.
30 Revista do Ceam, v. 2, n. 2, jul./dez. 2013
This explains Brazil’s refusal – in the Lula Government – to support 
FTAA and in the end its decision to kill the project.
The main responsible for Brazil’s refusal in supporting the FTAA/Alca 
was Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães.28 Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães occupies the 
second position in Brazilian diplomacy – he is the General-Secretary of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the arrival of President Lula to power in 
2003. For Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, “the FTAA would lead to the disappe-
aring of Mercosur”.29
Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães considered that FTAA/Alca and Mercosur 
were incompatible and FTAA would “swallow” Mercosur in the case of both 
regional integration schemes were working together.30 He also believes that 
the FTAA was part of US project to “subordinate South America to US pro-
jects of hegemony”.31
Therefore, the prevailing view in the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Itama-
raty) – including both the Minister himself, Ambassador Celso Amorim, and 
the General-Secretary Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães –, is that the FTAA/Alca 
project jeopardizes Brazilian interests.
In this respect, it is important to note, the main concern of Brazilian 
diplomacy, is not with national firms, but with Brazil’s pretension to obtain a 
seat in the U.N. Security Council.
The most important integration schemes (In Brazil’s perspective)
Currently, there are three main possibilities of regional integration: 
i. Preferential agreements (sector based)
The most favored integration scheme by Brazil was Preferential Agree-
ments. This was the case with Lafta and Aladi. Nevertheless, such Agreements 
suppose that there will be a high level of coordination and convergence of 
interests – what not always is true. Therefore, in spite the fact that both arran-
gements – Lafta in the 1960’s and Aladi in the 1980s – had such arrangements 
and most of them did not prosper.
28 It is important to remember that Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães was the main responsible for the signature 
of integration agreements between Brazil and Argentina during the period that he served in Brazilian 
Embassy in Argentina (1986-1987). The opinions of Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães are based in his inter-
view to the site Global 21 (http://www.global21.com.br/entrevistas) published in 24/02/2001 and to 
magazine Veja in 22/10/2003 (edition’s number 1825).
29 Interview of Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães to magazine Veja, 22/10/2003 (ed. 1825). This is the name of 
one of Samuel Guimarães’ articles to the book he edited: Guimarães (1999).
30 Interview of Pinheiro Guimarães to the site Global 21 (http://www.global21.com.br/entrevistas).
31 Interview of Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães to magazine Veja, 22/10/2003 (ed. 1825).
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ii. Free trade agreements
Free Trade Agreements are not useful to Brazil because it would reduce 
completely the protection of Brazilian firms with one co-lateral effect: Some 
sector where Brazil is not competitive – let us say, Personal Computers – could 
se the neighbor country to enter in the local market. For this reason, Brazi-
lian government was always against to enter in a direct Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) with Argentina. Brazil feared for its capital goods and Information 
Technology (IT) industries that it believed was not ready to compete in a 
global scale.
iii. Custom union 
Custom Union is the current stage of Mercosur. Due to the relatively 
high number of sectors which are not covered by the Agreement (around 10% 
of the total), itin Brazil Mercosur is called an “Imperfect Custom Union”. If it 
is an Mercosur is an imperfect a Custom Union, why it is the Agreementr by 
Brazil?
In short, the Custoom Union allowed Brazil to establish a Common Ex-
ternal Tariff (TEC- Tarifa Externa Comum) which worked as a “natural de-
fense” against imports from countries which were not ebers of the bloc (Mer-
cosur). It also allowed a “selective” operation of the products that would enter 
in the Common External Tariff and those that would not. In other words, a 
Custom Union allowed Brazil to keep protectionist practices without having 
the burden of admitting it. The Custom Union can always be blamed by the 
protectionist of one (or more ) of its members.
A Custom Union also increases the power capabilities of leader because it 
can claim that it controls a market that is bigger than in fact it is responsible 
for. Therefore, in the case of Mercosur, Brazil can always pretend that it is ne-
gotiating in the name of the other countries, when in fact it is only supporting 
its own position. As, in most cases, the other negotiators don’t know in which 
case the leader is representing the other members or when it is bluffing, they 
tend to accept the position of the leader as the official position of the bloc. Of 
course there is always the risk of the leader being demoralized, but Brazilian 
government believe that it is worthy running the risk. One can not forget that 
as the leader has more power capabilities than the other countries it can always 
accommodate rebel members with small concessions in that area or in other 
areas. One should also not forget that as Custom Union in general adopt some 
kind of “consensus mechanism” to obtain decisions, the leader country tend 
to benefit more than the other from this mechanism, because no decision can 
be taken without the previous consent of the leader. Besides, Custom Union 
do not necessary require supranational institutions.
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iv. Common market
In the case of regional integration schemes, there is also the possibility 
of a common market. However, common markets have many disadvantages 
when compared to the Custom Union. It requires the existence of a minimum 
of consensus related to the Common External Tariff, for example, which Mer-
cosur has not reached.
Furthermore, in general common market tend to adopt supranational 
institutions and majority-vote schemes. Decisions would become more ratio-
nal and more based on technical reasons.
Brazil is against all these features because they could become a threat to 
its hegemonic intentions. Therefore, majority votes could dissolve the power 
of the leader in the organizations it has created. These are the reasons why Bra-
zil Mercosur to become a Common Market, in spite of the fact that Mercosur 
has a Common Market as one of its goals.
v. Economic integration
This is the most sophisticated of all regional integration schemes. Howe-
ver, the same considerations mentioned above to a common market automa-
tically apply to an economic integration scheme.
How can some countries discuss a common currency if they do not have 
a common external tariff or even common economic policy?
Therefore, an economic integration requires a high degree of coordina-
tion not only for a Common External Tariff but also for macro-economic 
policies and fiscal. No country can print money or raise taxes without prior 
consent fron m other countries. It also requires that Central Banks are either 
fully integrated or acting firmly together.
Mercosur’s experience shows us that when there is a problem in one of 
the countries currencies, it tend to transfer the problems to their members. 
It happened with the devaluation of the Argentinean peso and with Brazilian 
real in the end of the 1990s.
Therefore, a full economic integration between countries of Mercosur 
seems currently out of the scope of the bloc. Only when Mercosur complete 
the requirements of a custom union it will be able to discus the formation of 
a more complete scheme, be it a Common Market or – more distantly – an 
economic integration in South America.
It can be concluded that currently the regional integration scheme whi-
ch is more prepared to serve the interests of its members (Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay – not included Venezuela yet) would be a free trade 
agreement (FTA) or a Custom Union.
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The different positions and interests regarding regional economic 
integration within the Brazilian society (government and business 
community)
The actors which take part in Brazilian foreign policy can be divided in 
two main groups: non-state and state actors. Non-State can be divided into 
four different groups: i) intellectuals and academia in general, ii) press and 
public opinion iii) civil society, social movement sand labour unions and iv) 
business community.
Non State Actors
i) Intellectuals and Academia in general
In general, it is considered that intellectuals individually have little direct 
impact in foreign policy (BOBBIO, 1991). An exception, in this perspective, 
is Bernal-Mesa (1998).
Bernal-Mesa (1998) considers that currently the role of intellectuals in 
the process of approximation of Brazil and Argentina, at least in the Argen-
tinean side. He states that: “[…] recently, a positive aspect has been the influ-
ence of public opinion and from ‘academia’ in the bilateral approximation. Never has 
been so much influence in the formation of public opinion and in the political circle 
of those sectors”.
The fact is that is very difficult to measure the influence of intellectuals 
in the formation of the thinking of decision-makers and even if intellectuals 
are consulted on a regular basis to help in the process of policy formulation. 
Brazilian tradition related to foreign policy is quite interesting and probably 
not unique. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) has its own School of 
International Relations (Instituto Rio Branco) for those approved in national 
exams for the diplomatic career.
Itamaraty then selects the Professors, most of them from Brazilian acade-
my, some international guests and some from its own diplomatic service to be 
the tutor of the students.
The Professors selected are, in general, those who have an ideological affi-
nity with the hegemonic groups in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, 
there is a process of mutual recognition of a similar identity, where those who 
share the same values32 will be invited not only to teach, but to cooperate in 
matters related to his or her expertise.
The same happens in the seminars promoted by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. In general, those are promoted in two main occasions: when there is 
few or insufficient knowledge about a certain topic of interest to Itamaraty, or 
32 What Charles Wright Millls used to call the values of the elites.
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there is a crisis in an issue and new ideas are required. In any case, what ever 
is the main reason for the seminar, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs convoke 
those intellectuals who are considered to be reliable – it sis would not expose 
publicly Itamaraty to its staff or public opinion – to give presentations in the 
seminar. The results of the seminar will then be analyzed by a very small circle 
of members of the government. Eventually policy formulation will occur ba-
sed on the results of the seminar.
Therefore, it can not be said that intellectuals, as whole, have influence in 
Brazilian foreign policy. But there is a small group of experts who are punc-
tually invited to give a contribution in a certain issue. This contribution can 
be repeated and happen in a regular basis (like a consultancy, for instance), or 
can be sporadically in case of change of the main responsible. In this scenario, 
if a big change in the individuals responsible for policy formulation happens 
(for instance, in the change from Cardoso to Lula government) the process is 
all repeated, but the experts will probably not be the same (except when the 
number of experts is very limited).
ii) The Press and Public Opinion 
In Brazil, foreign policy was – until recently – a very restrict topic. There 
were few courses of international relation in the country and the news about 
international affairs were commented by few journalist who became experts 
(or specialised) in the cover of international events, but had no formation or 
background in International Relations itself.
Although the situation of the courses of International Relations has chan-
ged33 but the background of journalist have not. Brazilian law require that 
articles in newspapers have to be written by journalists, it is, individuals with 
a degree in Communication. As a result, no newspapers in Brazil can hire ex-
perts in international relations. The effect of this requirement is that Brazilian 
journalists, in general, have no background in International Relations, what 
affect the preparation of articles to its newspaper or its mass media. In order 
to “compensate” his/her own deficiency, the journalist used to ask an opinion 
of a diplomat, who would give a piece of information in the condition of not 
being exposed. As a result, the information or data passed to the press was 
already selected by the Brazilian government, generating a very curious phe-
nomena, the government would supply the content of the information that 
would be “released” by the communications channels.
33 Of course the situation of courses of international relations has changed after the 1990’s, when many 
students sent abroad to carry out Ph.D. courses came back to Brazil. But it is important to note that 
until the 1990’s there was no Doctorate program of International relations in Brazil. All lecturers hired 
until the end of the 1990’s had necessarily their formation abroad. Nowadays, the courses of interna-
tional relations (I.R.) mushroomed in Brazil until the point that there is no market for so many under 
graduates in I.R.
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In this way, Brazilian press reproduced consciously or unconsciously the 
perspective of the formulators of Brazilian foreign policy until the 1990’s, 
when a new generation of experts of international affair swas vailable to offer 
alternative content to the press.
Quite surprisingly, the most wanted experts are those who tend to legi-
timize the actions of Brazilian government, it is, those who share the same 
values of the government or the values of Brazilian elites.
This is not say that Brazilian foreign diplomacy is not criticized by the 
media. The issues picked by the media in general are those that can have a 
more popular appeal: the kidnapping of US Ambassador in Brazil during the 
military regime, Brazilian tourist who were prevented to enter in Spain, the 
expropriation of Petrobras’s assets in Bolivia, the prison of the Directors of a 
Brazilian engineering firm in Equator and so on.
Therefore, Brazilian media and the specialised journalists tend to cover 
more facts and events than process (such as r-the Doha Round).
In this way, the press can be very influential about facts: how Brazil should 
be dealing with Bolivian government in the case of Petrobras, but tend to have 
little influence on process (such as Mercosur).
Manzur (1999) has a different view from that expressed above. However, 
she refers to a specific period of Brazilian history, during the Foreign Indepen-
dent Policy (1961-1964), when Brazilian foreign policy became a hot political 
issue during the electoral campaign. So, this short period (1961-1964), can 
not be considered as a reference for the role of public opinion or for the role 
of the press.
As Manzur (1999) admits, [...] It is interesting to note that when popu-
lism entered in collapse [in 1964], it became evident solely a reflux of the par-
ticipation of public opinion in the issues of foreign policy, without meaning 
[this reflux] necessarily, the total alienation of public opinion on international 
issues.
In the opinion of Ambassador Marcos Coimbra, the press tends to be 
simplistic in analyzing the international issues, always looking for a winner 
and a loser, without understanding the real complexity of international nego-
tiations.34
This perspective is shared by the journalist and Political Scientist Mauri-
cio Santoro. In his article, Santoro (s/d), describes the lack of reliable sources 
that the journalists have available to use to cover an international issue. In 
the case of Brazil- many times the journalist is obliged to use foreign sources 
and materials, which do not always see the problem from the perspective of 
Brazilian national interests.
34 In: <http://www.mre.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1893>.
36 Revista do Ceam, v. 2, n. 2, jul./dez. 2013
iii) Civil Society, Social Movement Sand Labour Unions
Mariano, Vigevani e Oliveira (2000, p. 262) have noted that the issue of 
Mercosur has not polarized the debates in Congress for lack of assimilation of 
the issue by politicians. This happened due to reasons, according to Mariano, 
Vigevani e Oliveira (2000): a) the vast already existing national agenda and 
b) the conception that the definition of foreign policy is not responsibility of 
politicians, but the federal government and its diplomacy.
Although Mariano, Vigevani e Oliveira (2000, p. 258) have pointed out 
the growing importance of non-state actors, they have not shown concretely 
the result of this growing importance.
Quite the opposite. In the only example of social participation which 
was given by them, Sub-Group of Work 10- of the Common Market Group 
(Social and Labour issues), no result was obtained until today (MARIANO; 
VIGEVANI; OLIVEIRA, 2000, p. 258). As a matter of fact, most Treaties 
and negotiations process in which Brazil is involved where there a space for 
civil society organizations (CSO), they are only forums for consult and they 
are not mandatory.
Labour Unions tend to be more organized since they feel they would 
be main loser of an unbalanced regional economic integration agreement. 
They are informally organized in Brazil through Nationally Centralized La-
bour Unions, in spite of the fact that there was no law regulating the existence 
of such Central Organizations. In case, the formation of National Labour 
Unions definitely increased its visibility. There are several Central Unions in 
Brazil, since the conservative ones to the extreme left. One of the most im-
portant – if not the main one – was CUT (Unified Central of Workers) – the 
Union arm of the President Lula Workers Party (PT). Nevertheless, the fact 
that the Workers Party (PT) has reached power diminished its “revolutiona-
ry” impetus. In spite of this fact, it continues to be against integration of all 
countries in America (which means, with the US), but it supports Mercosur 
and Unasur, as the Workers Party does. They do not lobby against economic 
regional integration. They prefer to organize demonstrations against the for-
mer attempt of launching FTAA.
The fact is that social participation in general is a challenge. In coun-
tries such as Brazil where civil society has a tradition of low participation, 
for historical reasons (BUARQUE DE HOLLANDA, 1998), the challenge 
is even bigger. If the issue is of international nature it can be expected a lower 
participation.35
35 Naturally, an exception in Brazil was again the Populist period (1945-1964) where there was a strong 
incentive (from political parties) to encourage people to participate in order to attract voters and win 
elections. This happens with new Constitution in Brazil but rarely with international issues. Two inter-
national which encouraged popular participation was the campaign against the payment of Brazilian 
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This happens due to the lack of incentive for collective action, as propo-
sed by Olson (1965) in the 1960’s. Indeed, most people tend to participate 
when they have something to gain or some thing very considerable to lose.
This explains why the most mobilised group of civil society are, generally 
speaking, the labour unions. The leaders of labour unions can anticipate, with 
a certain degree of certitude, if its category tend to win or lose from a political 
(or economic fact) and to led the union (and the category as a whole) to esta-
blish a position the in towards the new fact, be it political or economic.
This happens with regional integration as well. If the unions are linked to 
a non-competitive sector, they can feel that they may become losers and act 
pro-actively preventively against it.
In the case of Mercosur, we have two different positions. As Gratius 
(2008) notes, we have Brazilian labour unions mobilized in favour of Mer-
cosur, while Argentinean unions are mobilised against it. As most unions in 
Argentina are associated to the Justicialist Party, this factor contributed to de-
crease the potential of opposition of Argentinean labour unions to Mercosur.
The Alca/FTAA project, on the other hand, was a different matter. The 
discussions of FTAA/Alca happened in Brazil during the Cardoso Govern-
ment. The main opposition Party to Cardoso Government, the Workers Party 
(PT) used the feeling of distrust of Brazilian population to the US, in general, 
to co-opt undecided voters and expand its popular support. It is interesting 
to note that when it arrived in power, in 2003, the PT maintained its initial 
opposition to the FTAA Agreement. After taking part in some international 
negotiations, the level of the Workers Party to the FTAA decreased, but the 
level of mistrust of Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs towards the FTAA 
Agreement increased.  This led to a very curious situation where the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs was the main responsible in Brazil for the mobilization of 
Labour Unions(in particular CUT from the Workers Party) against FTAA/
Alca process and not the PT itself.36
There are other groups which investigate and have strong views in re-
gional integration, such as the Press, the Academia, and Student Associations 
(UBES, from high school, and UNE, from university students), and Pro-
fessional Associations’. However, none of them are really mobilised as lobby 
groups or putting pressure in political representatives (MPs or Deputies).
Increasingly influential political actors are the Non Governmental Or-
ganizations (NGOs). They put together access to good quality information 
foreign debt in the 1980’s, promoted by a coalition of parties with the support of Catholic Church, and 
the campaign against FTAA, also promoted by the Catholic Church with the support of some Labor 
Unions.
36 PT was very divided in the issue. The PT did not want to assume the full responsibility for the failure 
of Alca/FTAA project. This role was played by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself.
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with access to key actors and a tremendous capacity of mobilization. They in-
creasingly heard, in particular when its founders are associated with Academia 
or has direct access to the Press.
In his research on social movements and the access to the decision mak-
ing policy, Drummond (1995, p. 160) concluded that “social actors”, in gen-
eral, but in particular those linked to the labour unions considered that the 
access to the decision making process was too limited.
Therefore, even when there was a wish to take part in Mercosur, this 
access was denied by the Brazilian Government. The creation of the Eco-
nomic and Social Forum at Mercosur did not change this feature, since the 
conclusions of the Forum were merely recommendatory and not deliberative 
(DRUMMOND, 1995, p. 164).
 
iv) business community
The business community was certainly the most active and articulated of 
all private actor, as Gratius (2008, p. 217) had already noted, Gratius pointed 
out, accurately, that Brazilian business community had solid institutions to 
represent its interests. Basic there are three main institutions who have a legal 
mandate to represent Brazilian business community:
a) the National Confederation for Agriculture (CNA);
b) the National Confederation for Commerce (CNC);
c) the National Confederation for Industry (CNI).37
Although Brazilian business community is historically well organized in 
terms of preserving its sector identity (through a vast country) and were success-
ful in preparing the access to political power and top decision makers in Brazil.
They were not (and some are still not) prepared to make claims or to put 
pressure in the search for advantages in international trade negotiations. This 
happens because international negotiations require a continuing follow up of 
those negotiations. In some cases, the National Confederation had only one 
person to follow all international negotiations, in Mercosur, FTAA, European 
Union and WTO.
As a result, even the National Confederation of Industries (CNI) exerci-
ses a very punctual lobby concerning regional integration and in most of the 
cases, they are not heard.38 In spite of the fact that they have an international 
37 There are also other National Confederations, such as National Confederation for Transports, but they 
are less representative in number of segments that they represent and less articulated than those men-
tioned above.
38 Although they have access to decision makers, the Brazilian has a huge space of maneuver, concerning 
international negotiations. We will discuss this issue in the next section.
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division only to deal with external negotiations, the various industries in its 
interior make them incapable of having an unified voice.
Therefore, the National Confederations which represent the business 
community in Brazil had to make an effort in the 1990’s to adapt its structu-
re to take part more productively and effectively in the international discus-
sions.39
In the case of National Confederation of Industry (CNI), it was built a 
strong and large structure to follow international negotiations, led by a Brazi-
lian academic, expert in international issues.
The National Confederation of Agriculture (CNA) followed another 
path. The solution it found to adapt itself to the new international context 
was to promote partnerships with Institutes and Research Groups who were 
interested in international trade negotiations of commodities.
Finally, in the case of National Confederation of Commerce (CNC), the-
re was a strategic decision of not following or taking part in international ne-
gotiations. Its limited international division follows only issues directly linked 
to electronic commerce.
The different positioning of the National Confederations’ opened a large 
space for the action of the state Federations, who try to fill the gap not occu-
pied by the National Confederations. In this respects, the Federations of In-
dustries of São Paulo (Fiesp), the most articulated occupies some of the space 
left by the National Confederations of Industry (CNI) and the Federation of 
Commerce and Services of São Paulo (FEComércio-SP) replaced the National 
Confederation of Commerce and Services as the main representative of the 
business sector as far as commerce and services are concerned.
With the exception of certain groups, such as farm producers, the typical 
Brazilian businessmen tend to ignore trade negotiations and expect the Bra-
zilin government or its federation to organise its own agenda and its answers 
to foreign challenges.
In fact, the “big business” don’t need their National Sector Confedera-
tion. They have direct access to the political representative of their state or the 
local Federation who will do mot part of his job. Only in emergency situation 
he will come to Brasilia to expose an international problem. If he has access to 
its Minister of its sector, he might look for the Minister directly.
39 There was an anecdotal fact that reveals this preparation of the business community. A bib Brazilian 
businessmen, representative of its sector and a global exporter of its commodity was invited to follow 
one of the meeting of the WTO and accepted the invitation. He then prepared a speech that he believed 
it would be necessary to do there in order to thank for the invitations ad for the hospitality. When he 
was warned that there was no speech and in fact he could not even take part in any discussion, because 
he would not be accepted even in the negotiation room, he got really angry with the Brazilian govern-
ment. This illustrates the lack of knowledge and communication between the private sector and Brazil-
ian government.
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The Brazilian Government, by its turn, has decided to bring the lobby to 
its own house and to nominate for the Ministries of Agriculture and the Mi-
nistry of Industry (respectively, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply 
(MAPA) and Ministry for Development of Industry, Services and Foreign 
Trade (MDIC)) recognized business leaders from each sector.40
This does not equal to say that the two sectors (agriculture and indus-
try) have reached all their goals either domestically or internationally. Indeed, 
Rodrigues left the government disappointed with the lack of priority given 
to agricultural sector in the Lula government.41 Furlan had the same feeling 
about Brazilian exporters.42
In any case, Drummond (1995) considered that the sectors who were 
the most active in Parliament was the agricultural sector from the three states 
(the South Region of Brazil: Paraná, Rio Grande and Santa Catarina) who 
have borders with other members of Mercosur. The sectors who felt most 
vulnerable to Mercosur were mainly agricultural: rice, onion, garlic, wheat, 
apple, peach and grapes. In the industrial sector, the most active opponents of 
Mercosur were the tobacco and wine producers who felt extremely threatened 
by Mercosur (DRUMMOND, 1995, p. 159).
From the Argentinean side, the most active business sectors agains M4er-
cosur were shoes, poultry, textiles. All of them were able to obtain protection 
for its products. More recently, businessmen from the electro domestic utili-
ties, in particular the so-called “white” segment for kitchens (freezers, ovens, 
refrigerators and soon) started a strong mobilization against Mercosur. They 
asked for protection and obtained. Cars have always have been a controversial 
issue in Mercosur.43
State actors
In order to know better the Decision making process towards Mercosur 
we would have to consider, initially, that potentially all Ministries and bodies 
of the State could decide to give its “contribution” to the process of regional 
integration.
40 The Minister of Agriculture, until two 2007 was Roberto Rodrigues, a farmer himself, and former Pre-
sident of Brazilian Organization of Cooperatives. He was also a well-known leader in agribusiness. He 
served as President of the prestigious Brazilian Rural Society and the Brazilian Agribusiness Association. 
The Minister of Industry, Luiz Fernando Furlan, was the owner of Sadia, one of the largest Brazilian 
companies in the areas of poultry, pork and beef.
41 See on the issue: <http://www.tjm.sp.gov.br/Noticias/0629rodrigues.htm> and <http://www.jornalop-
cao.com.br/index.asp?secao=RuralBusiness&subsecao=Suplement>.
42 See: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/colunas/brasiliaonline/ult2307u145.shtml>, <http://www.
desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/interna/noticia.php?area=1&noticia=6801d> or <http://www.cbic.org.
br/mostraPagina.asp?codServico=497&codPagina>.
43 Brazil and Argentina promoted an Automotive Regime to prevent the opening of the market. See: 
<www.econ.fea.usp.br/novo2/publicacoes/estudos_economicos/33_4/sergito.pdf>, <www.scielo.br/
pdf/spp/v16n2/12113.pdf> or <ppe.ipea.gov.br/index.php/ppe/article/view/187/121>.
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Indeed, since Mercosur covers so many topics, from health and education 
to defence, all the respective Ministries could decide to be involved.
However, in order to avoid an over-crowded of actors willing to take part 
on it, the process is organized by the Brazilian State in a centralized way. On 
this issue, Gratius (2008, p. 17) states that:
[…] It [Mercosur] is an intergovernmental process [of regional integration] di-
rected from the above (“desde arriba”), where the different phases of the develo-
pment of the bloc have been strongly influenced by the political context of the 
respective governments in power. […]
Mariano, Vigevani e Oliveira (2000, p. 251) say the same thing in an 
indirect way:
In the Brazilian case [of the decision making process], which can be generalized 
to the other member-countries [of Mecosur] not always the institutional space 
for [public] intervention has resulted in a real influence in the development of 
the integration process and in the representation of effective political and social 
interests [of the population].
Oliveira (2000, p. 225) express the same conclusion from another pers-
pective:
[…] One of the goals of Mercosur is to encourage the growing mobilization 
of non-governmental sectors, and, above all, the creations of private common 
interests and even supranationals, that could influence in the [regional] process. 
But, in spite of the fact that several groups of active politically did appear, for the 
moment they are insufficient to demand a determining and constant role in the 
process [of regional integration] […]
Not less important, Pecci (2002, p. 265-268) has thought us that:
[…] It seems indispensable to me that governments [of Mercosur] open themselves in a 
decisive way to a process of consultations with [civil] society in order to redraw the struc-
ture [of Mercosur] to overcome its deficiencies and to start a project of takin-off of our 
economies and regional cultures […]
2. Deficit. It seems evident that Mercosur has had important deficits. In first place, it 
keeps itself too far from the citizens, from civil society organizations, from the academic 
world with an opaque and unreachable super-structure. […]
5. Democratic Participation. I understand that it should be encouraged organic spaces of 
of wider participation of the organized society or from institutional feature. That is the 
case of Social and Economic Consultation Forum, that should stop being an appendix [of 
the structure] in order to obtain more influence in the definition of certain public policies 
that reach the productive and the social sector […]
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From the statements above one can conclude that:
a. there is a highly centralized process;
b. decisions are taken from the top-down;
c. there must be an agency which centralizes the process and decides who can 
take part and who can not;
d. there is a small group of individuals who will select the next directions of 
the integration process.
For Medeiros (2000), the main force behind the Mercosur’s integration 
process is the Finance Ministry. Medeiros (2000, p. 200) argues that:
[…] It is in this context of correlation of forces that the Ministry of Finance 
decided to devalue real. Through a hermetic process, this Ministry [the Finance 
Ministry] deviate from coordination practices or even a mere consultation with 
the partner of Mercosur and spite of the fact of being aware of the high depen-
dency of those countries before Brazil […].
The hegemony of Ministry of Finance can hardly be contested and its gro-
wth does save even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Itamaraty] […].
It seems that in the argument above there was a confusion of cause and 
effect. Mercosur is not a Common Market yet. Macroeconomic policies in a 
custom union are not coordinated (and are not supposed to be). Therefore, 
financial issue (such as monetary policy) in a Custom Union are not “trade” 
issues and should not be confused with financial services that can object of 
international trade.
Besides, the Ministry of Finance is not in charge of day-to-day decisions 
of Mercosur. The Brazilian policy on Mercosur and other issues related to re-
gional integration is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who 
used this legal authority to play a significative role in the decision making pro-
cess in the regional integration path taken in the Southern Cone (MARIANO; 
VIGEVANI; OLIVEIRA, 2000, p. 203). Indeed, the Working Groups, which 
could be “real threat” to Brazilian Government, are effectively coordinated by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Besides, as it was already demonstrated above, 
have only a Consultation role (OLIVEIRA, 2000; PECCI, 2002).
In fact, is spite of the fact that Brazilian government has more than 30 
Ministries (or equivalent bodies), It could be said that only three really matter 
as far as regional integration is concerned: The Presidency of the Republic 
(as a whole), the Ministry of Finance (together with Central Bank) and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty). All other Ministries (and Secretariats) 
are subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in issues related to regional 
integration.
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The main question is: Why and how does it happen?
For two very simple reasons:
a. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the only organ of Brazilian government 
which is prepared to deal with virtually all regional integration issues.
b. Due its centralized nature, any decision taken in any place of Mercosur 
necessary has to be approved by the top authorities of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs who are in essence two: The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Gene-
ral Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.44
Of course decisions about tariffs are Ministry of Finance’s a prerogative. 
This is the reason why the Ministry of Finance is the only Ministry which can 
effectively stop Itamaraty as Medeiros (2000) noted. On the other hand, it is 
the only Ministry which is really respected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
That is why the Ministry of Foreign Affiairs tries to “cooperate” with the Min-
istry of Finance and vice-versa. If any negotiator decides to offer a concession 
in a given issue, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will consult the respective 
sector’s Ministry to know if it is a sensitive product or sector45 before taking 
a decision.
In general, Ministry of Finance does not influence in day-to-day issues of 
Mercosur (since the Ministry of Finance leaves the ordinary issues to Itamara-
ty) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty), in its turn, seeks to consult 
the Ministry of Finance about issues that it knows that Ministry of Finace will 
have a word to say, such as the impact of the tax system in foreign trade, trade 
regimes or financial issues when they appear in the discussions. If the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs know beforehand the position of Ministry of Finance (or 
any other Ministry), Itamaraty might present the position straight way.
For Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is easy to know the position of each 
Ministry because it holds Regional Integration Meetings. In those Meetings, 
in general before the main international negotiation rounds, each Ministry (or 
secretariat) presents its official position to the Ministry in charge of Brazil’s 
International Negotiations (Itamaraty). Itatmaraty takes note of each posi-
tion. In some cases, if a negations’ round is really important, Itamaraty might 
present in the return of the trip, the result of the negotiations occurred. This 
is an opportunity for each Ministry to “learn” if its initial position was “kept” 
or if there was an evolution in Brazil’s position.46 In short, Brazilian decision 
making process can be summarized as follows:
44 With the exception of tariffs, taxes and financial issues which are prerogatives of the Finance Ministry.
45 Such as wheat in Brazil or sugar in Argentina.
46 For the evolution of Brazil’s position in the Uruguay Round, see Caldas (1998).
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Structure of Brazil’s decision making process towards Mercosur
 President 
of Republic 
Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
(Itamaraty) 
International Affairs 
Central Bank 
(Bacen) 
Ministry C 
Ministry B 
Ministry A 
Ministry I 
Ministry D 
Ministry H 
Ministry G 
Ministry F 
Ministry E 
Ministry J 
As it could be noted, Itamaraty becomes the centre of the negotiation 
process. The President, together with his international advisers, discusses the 
general guidelines of foreign policy if it is relevant theme. If it is not a central 
issue it will be decided by Itamaraty directly. In any case, the full execution of 
the foreign policy decided is the responsibility of Itamaraty.
The international advisor of President will prevent from interfering in the 
domestic (“internal”) issues of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, except if the 
issue is of direct interest of the President or his Political Party. Thus if the Party 
has a sympathy for a certain candidate it might interfere accelerating his (or 
her) promotion. The same happens with the choice of positions that it will be 
occupied in the most disputed areas (Us and Buenos Aires, for instance).
Therefore, generally speaking, Brazilian position in international forums 
reflect the thinking of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (“Itamaraty”). Of course 
the President selects an Ambassador who is sympathetic to his political party, 
as it was the case of Ambassador Celso Amorim (the Minister) and Ambas-
sador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (the General Secretary). Both had clear 
positions against the US and for this reason, they were chosen to command 
Itamaraty, which really needs a “combined” operation. Indeed, given the com-
plexity of international issues, the position of General-secretary in Itamaraty 
is regarded as a Vice-Minister with a real possibility of becoming a Minister of 
Foreign affairs in the future, if political context becomes favourable.
Threfore, Itamaraty prepares “the agenda” of the President, saying what 
is important and what is not, and what position Brazil should present in a 
given issue.
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is there a sole theory that explains Brazil’s overall foreign
policy?
Philippe C. Schmitter (2003, p. 4-5) has claimed that:
[…] I think that all students of regional integration – first and foremost, those 
working on the European Union – now understand that no single theory will 
be capable of explaining its dynamics and predicting its outcome. Efforts to 
select out specific events, policies or institutions and subject them to simplified 
assumptions may produce momentary “confirmations” of a specific theory, but 
often at the expense of contrary evidence and countervailing trends. […] unders-
tanding and explanation in this field of inquiry [regional integration] are … best 
served not by the dominance of a single “accepted” grand model or paradigm, but 
by the simultaneous presence of antithetic and conflictive ones which – while they 
may converge in certain aspects – diverge in so many others. If this sort of dialectic 
of incompleteness, unevenness and partial frustration propels integration processes 
forward, why shouldn’t it do the same for the scholarship that accompanies them?
If the statement of Schmitter (2003) is true for European Integration is 
even truer for regional integration of South America, in particular Mercosur.
It is very hard to find out which frame work best explain the develop-
ments of Mercosur in its last 20 years.
Firstly, perhaps it would be easier starting with the theories that can not 
explain Mercosur’s developments and should be immediately discarded. This 
is the case in first place with neo-functionalism (or even neo-neo functiona-
lism). The crisis of Mercosur in the end of 1990’s and in the beginning of the 
2000’s, the lack of spillover effects, the weak participation of civil society and 
the strong presence of the state oblige us to not consider functionalism and its 
derivations as a valid theory for Mercosur.
Secondly, all theories that imagine the existence of an identity before (or 
after) the regional integration process, such as the cognitive theories should 
also be discarded. There is certainly no Merco-citizen or whatever identity that 
a Brazilian could share with an Argentinean. The values and cultures of both 
countries are just incapable of generating a “common identity” linked to the 
regional process (before or after). These ideas are typical constructions to try 
to justify the integration process, but which lack real basis (PECCI, 2002). 
The national populations were not motivated by the project (SCHAPOSNIK, 
1997, p. 13).
To try to use Institutionalism (or even neo-institutionalism) to explain 
Mercosur is like to try to explain the forms of life in Venus – something that 
one has ever seen and probably will never exist.
The fact is that Mercosur has no institutions. Oliveira (2000, p. 237) 
denominates it elegantly as “Minimum Institutionalism” (“institucionalismo 
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mínimo”). I call it “Forged Instituticonslim” or “quasi-institutionalism”. The 
existing arrangements are a mere formal construction to offer a minimum 
impression of legality but each side is aware that it will break the rules soon or 
later. The trade disputes between Brazil and Argentina on several issues (such 
as sugar, cars etc) only illustrate the lack of commitment (of both parts) to 
previously negotiated agreements and rules.
So, the maximum of Krasner (1983, p. 1) that international regimes are 
“principles, norms and rules and decision making procedures around which 
actors expectations converge in a given issue-area” certainly does not apply to 
Mercosur as a whole or to Brazil and Argentina in particular. The incorpora-
tion of international rules to domestic legislation is also very problematic n 
Mercosur as Basso e Estrela (2002, p. 31) have noted.
Brazil’s refusal to accept supranational institutions only confirms the fra-
gility of Mercosur’s quasi-institutions.
A framework that apparently could be used to explain Mercosur’s develo-
pments would be the theory Liberal Intergovernamentalism.
Indeed as the theory suggests, Mercosur has four members who work 
together in an environment of intergovernmental “institutions” or, better 
saying, procedures.
On the other hand, many premises of intergovernamentalism simply are 
not present in the case of Mercosur:
States have not cooperated even when it seemed that it would be the best •	
for their national interests to do so;Institutions have not fallen the natio-
nal interest. States live in a world of uncertainty [Mercosur], where each 
new meeting of the bloc may modify previous rules, procedures and agre-
ements.
Furhermore, there was no Domestic preference formation, or policy 
demand from civil society as Moravcsik (1993) had suggested, because the 
structure in inadequate, as Mariano, Vigevani e Oliveira (2000, p. 283) have 
suggested.
The civil society actors in Mercosur have been too fragmented and dis-
organized to influence a policy demand or the formation of policies, not to 
mention institutions. Among them, it could be mentioned, in particular, so-
cial movement groups, special interests, the legislature, who don’t take part 
actively in the process as it was already demonstrated. Therefore, If there was, 
such a policy demand it was certainly destroyed or ignored by the decision 
makers, as Barros (2002, p. 27-30), the representative of the Social and Eco-
nomic Forum of Mercosur melancholically noted.
Another controversial point is that Moravscik (1993) believes that eco-
nomic interests, in general, prevail over other interests. This is not clear in 
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the case of Mercosur. For Brazil, Mercosur is a political project and not an 
economic bloc (in opposite to Argentina).
In Mercosur, there was little Interstate bargaining, or policy supply. The 
features of most procedures of Mercosul were imposed by Brazil in the other 
country members.
Therefore, theory Liberal Intergovernamentalism would have problems 
in accept that interstate bargaining really explains the policies chosen by the 
leader of the bloc, Brazil.
This paper wants to propose a modified version of neorealist approach. 
This paper suggest that states compete, but not necessarily for power, but 
mainly for prestige and values. The adoption of its values or the defeat of 
inimies’ value would be the ultimate victory. Brazil (and Mercosur) have done 
just it with the decay of FTAA – an US project. It was important for Brazilian 
decision makers to defeat the and its “neoliberal” projects.
Therefore, States don’t act necessarily based on his interests, but mainly 
for its ideology.
Brazilian former ambassador in Washington, Roberto Abdenur, stated 
publicly in an interview to Brazilian largest magazine Veja that “there is an 
ideological substract vaguely anti-capitalist, anti-globalization, anti-american, 
completely over passed” Brazilian society in general and in Itamaraty in par-
ticular.47
Schaposnik (1997, p. 213) sustains that there is an ideological line that is 
maintained in the regional integration process of Mercosur.
Therefore, the sates are motivated by ideas as Goldstein and Keohane 
(1993) had suggested. On the other hand, the fight for ideas (or for ideologies 
to be more precise) does not mean that the fight for power was abandoned. 
Quite the opposite. The fight for power is one of the features from Mercosur, 
in particular from a Brazilian perspective.
States also seek prestige. It is the case of Brazil where itamaraty intro-
duced as one of the “permanent goals” of our diplomacy a seat in the UN 
Security Council. Finally, the State – in opposition to what the neorealist 
suggests – is not an unified agency. It is very fragmented. Domestically, agen-
cies (Ministries) also fight for power, defined as space to present, to cancel or 
to support its own bureaucratic projects. In the case of Brazil, needless to say, 
there a dominant agency, which controls the process. This dominant agency 
is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty). Therefore, it is proposed here a 
neorealist interpretation of Mercosur, where the main actor (Brazil) fights for 
prestige and power.
47 Interview to Veja in 03/02/2007. It is interesting to note that Abdenur was initially member of the cur-
rent left wing which controls Itamaraty and eventually broke up with the group and became one of its 
main critics.
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This proposed approach maintains, as neo-realists do, the State is still the 
main actor in international relations. It can also consider that Some gains can 
also be obtained through international cooperation. In this respect, regional 
integration can increase the power capabilities of a local hegemon to achieve 
its personal goals. This is the case of Brazil with its search of a seat in the Se-
curity Council.
Therefore, neo-realism works better the issue of Hegemony. This hege-
mony is the charactistic of Brazil’s relation with other member of Mercosur. 
Neo-realism explains the power disputes in Mercosur which go from small 
conflicts to political confrontation. In any case fight for hegemony is present 
in the bloc.
As Cerqueira (2008) has demonstrated: “It is clear that Brazilian regional 
leadership evolved, in the last six years from denied pretension denied by 
Itamaraty to a public condition, accepted and stated by the President of the 
Republic”.
Indeed, Brazil, organized promoted four international meetings in around 
48 hours: Mercosur, Unasur, Group of Rio and Cúpula da América Latina e 
do Caribe (Calc). All of them are exclusively Latin-Americans. Will not be 
present either the US nor European Union (EU).
Neorealism can explain all these meeting as a Reaction of a weaker state 
(Brazil) vis-à-vis a regional hegemon or aggressive state. The US when it tried 
to “impose” FTAA to South America.
Neorealism also explains the inclusion of Venezuela in Mercosur as a for-
mula to limit a possible hegemon or competitor of Brazil in South American 
leadership into Mercosur’s rules, that Brazilian diplomacy masters.
Finally, another theory which helps to explain Mercosur is Globalization 
Regional Integration offered Brazil a way-out of a deadlock situation: How to 
accept the globalization pressures without making concessions?
The answer was a Custom Union. Here there was a crossing of neorealism, 
which emphasizes regionalism as a way of “solving problems”, and Globalist 
view that regional integration is a result of a historical process. It is accepted 
that both are correct. Latin American was an old dream of Brazil. Neorealism 
offered the solution: the Custom Union.
These theories, altogether (neo realism and globalization) contribute to 
explain South American’s process of regional integration. But in order to as-
sume regional leadership, Brazil has decided to advance in the regional inte-
gration process, with a “reterritorialisation of itsgeographical basis from domestic 
territory to South America”. Brazil takes advantage of the fact that some coun-
tries are not prepared to assume international roles either because they don’t 
have a proper defence system or because they don’t have enough capability 
resources and Brazil wants to represent them in the UN system.
49Revista do Ceam, v. 2, n. 2, jul./dez. 2013
In order to achieve this goal, Brazil promotes the feeling of “Security” and 
“Tradition” between “Reliable” countries recurring to the old dream of Latin 
American Integration.
conclusions: Brazil’s current foreign policy and perspectives
One of the main features of Brazilian diplomacy is the existence of some 
maintenance of general guidelines. These guidelines evolve according to the 
external context (due to global pressures) and domestic (political) changes in 
Brazil, in particular in the Presidency.
Nevertheless, some goals remain as part of the driving forces of Brazilian 
foreign diplomacy. Therefore, significant part of Brazil’s current diplomatic 
agenda has not started during the incumbent government (President Lula’s 
Administration).
Each government likes to say that it has taken Brazil’s diplomacy to a new 
level and that it has broken some paradigms of Brazilian diplomacy.
Let us examine some of them.
One example is multilateralism. Brazilian diplomats like to say that one 
of the features of the current government is to support “multilateralism” and 
“International Organizations”. This is true, but the practice of ‘multillatera-
lism’ in Brazil goes back at least to the 1950’s with Pan-American Operation 
and Foreign Independent Policy.
As it was illustrated in this article, another pattern of Brazilian diplo-
macy is to seek to contain (or at least to counter-balance) US influence in 
South America. When US tried to increase its influence for regional (limit 
the influence of Cuban Government in South America) or global issues (fi-
ght communism) Brazil answered reinforcing South American integration. In 
this respect, any attempt to put regional integration forces together requires 
an alliance – or at least good relations - of Brazil and Argentina – in South 
America.
Therefore, Argentina is a key country for Brazil’s regional leadership am-
bitions. In order to strengthen Brazil’s position in South American the sup-
port of Argentina is a condition sine qua non.
Almeida’s (2005) analizysis quite accurate when he says that the streng-
thening of Mercosur can be seen as part of an integration and a consolidation 
of Brazilian policy to South America.
Almeida (2005) also noted that the president’s Lula first mandate was 
influenced by his main Political Party – PT (Workers Party/“Partido dos Tra-
balhadores”) conceptions, as an attempt to create a new Brazilian diplomacy. 
This “new policy”, in fact, was a search of a revival of Brazil’s Foreign Indepen-
dent Policy of the 1960’s in another and more complex international scenario. 
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As a result, in his second term in office (2006 - ?) President Lula was obliged 
to moderate his initial “progressive” trends. Besides that, an unexplainable 
personal chemistry between President and Republican President Bush created 
a mutual sympathy and mutual respect which prevented a complete radicali-
zation of each side against the other.
The US also saw President Lula as a “good” influence in South America 
for its personal moderation. Brazilian diplomacy, for its turn, wqas very skill-
ful to not transform Brazil’s ambition for more international prestige as a fight 
aginst the US or against any other country, as happened in other moments, 
such as in the Goulart Government (1961-1964) who was overthrown by a 
military coup.
 Indeed, the second term of President Lula, after 2006, the pragmatic 
approach prevailed over ideological disputes. Although ideology is implicit in 
the current Brazilian diplomacy, by the persons chosen to command Itama-
raty, Brazil does not bring it to international forum. The current mandate of 
Lula has established as its top priority to improve its relations with the local 
partners in Mercosur (Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay) and try to attract 
other actors to Mercosur’s orbit. In particular should be mentioned Mexico, 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Equator and Cuba. This move was partially successful. At 
the same time that Brazil tried to put into practice this strategy, the emergence 
of Chavez in Venezuela created a new dynamic in South America which was 
beyond Brazil’s control. It is too soon to judge the results of the entry of Ve-
nezuela in Mercosur. But its entry does make Mercosur less flexible (as it was) 
as a tool of Brazilian foreign policy to achieve Brazil’s goals.
For Brazil, to establishing strategic alliances with other actors in South 
America through UNASUR was a way of counter-balancing the increasing 
inefficacity and limitations of Mercosur.
The “new Brazilian diplomacy” of government Lula in fact only revivals 
the old goal of searching a set for Brazil in the Security Council with new 
clothes. Since a Refo5rm in The UN’s Security Council is based on power 
capabilities and in the humors of the Great Powers, such as the US, China 
and Russia, Brazil is trying to explore at maximum the possibility of alliances, 
making use of its external policy to achieve its oldest project of international 
projection.
In an international context which has as its main feature a certain decline 
in US hegemony to impose its priorities (as the Iraqi war and Doha Round 
of WTO illustrates), Brazilian aspirations need more and more allied coun-
tries within South America region and globally. That is why ahs a pro-active 
policy of approaching France, China and Russia is in progress. One should 
not forget that Brazil has just received President Sarkozy last December. Brazil 
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hopes that the fact of having recognized China as a market economy (in an 
open exchange for Chinese support of Brazilian aspiration for a place in the 
Security Council) will pay-off in the right moment.
Brazilian diplomacy is aware that there is a struggle by other South Ame-
rican countries to occupy part of that space, in particular Venezuela, Argenti-
na and Mexico. However, Brazil feels that it is the most prepared to join the 
Council not only by the fact that Barzil has already presided it, but for having 
the more stable macroeconomic conditions and international relations than 
Argentina. Venezuela would be vetoed by the US under any circumstance. 
Brazil argues does nor represent South America since it is included in FTA 
with the US.
So, Brazilian diplomacy presents Brazil as the country with more chances 
of getting accepted as the main representative of South America in case there 
is a reform in the Security Council.
Brazilian diplomacy acts according to realist perspective, which sees in-
ternal arena as anarchical. There is a fight for space, power, prestige in interna-
tional arena where relations of power and power capabilities prevail. 
Brazil is also aware that even in a context of diminishing hegemony, the 
US will continue to exercise its limited hegemony due to the lack of another 
actor in clear conditions to challenge its power.
As Gelson Fonseca (1998) states, Brazil became aware that it is too small 
to influence alone the international system, but too big to accept the interna-
tional order without any complaint. In Fonseca’s view, it is the regional coo-
peration that makes Brazil a major international actor. However, the regional 
actors in South America, such as Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia and Equator 
insist in behaving outside Brazilian script. The perception – true or false – of 
those actors that Brazil needs them more than they need Brazil have made 
them act as they want and have led to innumerous setbacks and humiliations 
to Brazil’s external relations in South America recently, from Venezuela to 
Equator (FONSECA, 1998).
The lack of Brazilian answers in both situations have led the other local 
actors to conclude that: 1) Brazil is too big to react and 2) Brazil can not react 
in order not to “compromise” its image of supporter of peace and peaceful 
resolution of conflicts (as the UN Charter suggests), even if the other mem-
bers are not behaving in a away that the UN Charter would approve. It is im-
portant to highlight that in conflict situations, Brazil is behaving as a typical 
candidate of UN Security Council. Brazil tries to follow the UN Charter even 
when no one else (in South America) is doing so. Therefore, the main focus of 
Lula’s external policy is still directed – as it has been done by Itamaraty in the 
last 50 years – to obtain the famous seta in The UN Security Council. Howe-
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ver, nowadays Brazil is not the sole candidate of South America any longer as 
it was mentioned above.
The instable context which characterizes South American today reflects 
that the leadership of Brazil and its influence in the region has been put into 
question by other emergent actors, such as Argentina, Venezuela and Colom-
bia – and outside the region, even by Mexico – all of them disputing a seat in 
the Security Council without a clear support or sign from the US government 
(except Mexico).
Brazil is very interested in expanding its regional leadership that it once 
hold in the past. In this respect, it has tried to increase its visibility outside the 
region, taking part in some UN missions in Africa (Angola), Central America 
(Haiti) and Asia (Timor Leste). Time will say if those missions will bring to 
Brazil the returns it expected. In some international organizations, such as 
OECD, Brazil has maintained a double (and dubious) position: taking part 
in the actions of the organization without being or searching openly its mem-
bership.
It is debatable if the fact that Brazil has decided to be one of the main 
providers of Mercosur’s compensatory fund, collaborating with 70% of its 
amount, will bring the expected political dividends. It might help to bring 
rebel countries (such as Equator) to its side.48 These resources could be useful 
in case the world financial crisis gets out of control.
In the case of a new breakdown of Argentinean economy, Brazil could 
also use its situation of stability to try to extract political bonus from the situ-
ation. However, Venezuela is doing the same. It is using its financial reserves 
derived from its oils exports to try to attract other countries to its orbit. It 
has been quite successful up to this point with Bolivia. The fact of Venezuela 
is buying Argentinean debt in international markets signalizes some political 
intentions of Venezuela as well.
Brazil’s strategy of offering financial support to help the infra-structures 
of smaller countries in South America through Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES) is still on the agenda. However, the actions of Equator will certainly 
decrease its speed, since BNDEs is under pressure to freeze its international 
operations in order not to allow another country to act as Equator did. Besides 
that, the unexpected need of huge sums of money by Brazilian oil company 
Petrobras, which is stripped of cash, will also suspend some financial opera-
tions from Brazil in the South American region for a while. In this scenario, 
the role that Unasur is expected to play is to offer Brazilian support (loans, 
48 Brazil can offer new loan to equator in exchange for the payment of its loans to Brazilian Development 
Bank BNDES.
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investments, aid and, in the last case, security) to countries who need them in 
exchange for the recognition of Brazilian leadership in the region.
Although Brazilian diplomacy wants to keep and expand Brazil’s role as 
a regional leadership, one should expect continuous new challenges to this 
situation if the financial crisis in the US is not put under control soon. It 
is not clear, yet, if Brazil will remain outside the financial crisis, as Brazilian 
authorities wish. If the financial crisis is not completely sorted out by new 
US elected President Obama in the first semester of 2009, Brazil might be 
obliged to review its financial priorities. In this scenario, Brazil’s international 
reserves may sound too small to keep an international presence and external 
influence over smaller South American and Caribbean countries as Brazilian 
diplomacy wants.
If financial crisis deepens, South American’s politics can also go in ano-
ther direction not desired by Brazilian authorities: neo-populism. If neopopu-
lism prevails, Brazil’s role might decrease, and Chavez’s role might increase.
Therefore, one can say that we are witnessing two simultaneous situations 
in South America: a deteriorating economic scenario, fall of commodity prices, 
including oil and gas, which affected South American producers (such as Ve-
nezuela, Bolivia and Equator), and the resurgence of neo-populism, led by Ve-
nezuela, but followed by Bolivia, Equator and Argentina. With neopopulism 
prevails, the Brazil old leadership will definitely be questioned.
Brazil, and in particular Itamaraty, will have to use all its skills to coun-
terbalance this new trend.
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